This special edition of the European Journal of Criminal and Research seeks to introduce the findings of a recent EU funded project to develop
Mechanisms for Assessing the Risk of Crime due to products in order to proof them at an EU level (hereafter referred to as Project MARC). This is supplemented by even more recent work informed by the approach adopted by MARC (including the difficulties it encountered). It is hoped thereby to provide a basis of information and theory to assist those working within the field of designing out crime to advance on Project MARC and to benefit from its hard-won results. A companion special issue of the Journal deals with the complementary strand of MARC work, namely the attempt to crime-proof legislation.
The crime proofing strand of Project MARC sought to develop a mechanism to assess the risk of theft of electronic products and to take steps to make that mechanism operational. In practice this meant reviewing existing crime risk assessment mechanisms, consulting with key stakeholders to establish whether the idea of a crime risk assessment mechanism was worth pursuing and if so, what form it should take. Steps were then taken to design a system to operationalise the measurement of risk.
The concept of manipulating the environment as a means of reducing crime is not new. The recognition that the environment can influence behaviour dates back thousands of years, with the formal study of the geography or pattern of socio-economic variables (and the social problems associated with these) commencing largely with the University of Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s and 1930s (Burgess, 1916 , Park et al, 1925 . Although the geography of social problems such as unemployment, delinquency and deprivation had been researched long before, specific reference to the potential to reduce crime through the design or manipulation of the environment began in the 1960s and 70s with research conducted by authors such as Jacobs (1961) , Jeffery (1971) and Newman (1973) . Recent research into the impact of environmental design upon crime has further explored the ability of design to influence crime levels (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981 Poyner, 1983 Poyner, , 2005 Poyner and Webb, 1987) , the effectiveness of practical schemes introduced to implement the principles of designing out crime, for example Secured by Design within the UK (Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 2000) and the differential impact of the individual elements of designing out crime (Brown and Altman, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg and Rohe, 1984; Cromwell and Olson, 1991; Brown and Bentley, 1993; Bevis and Nutter, 1997; Hillier and Chi-Feng Shu, 1998; Chi-Feng-Shu, 2000; Armitage 2006 Armitage , 2007 .
Similarly, measurement of risk or hazard within criminology is not new.
i As Wiles et al (2003) highlight: "There are at least four criminal justice contexts in which understanding and communicating risk is important" (p.1). The four areas in which risk-assessment within criminology has traditionally focused are: the chance of someone embarking on a criminal career (West and Farrington, 1973; West, 1982; Farrington, 1978 Farrington, , 1986a Farrington, , 1986b Farrington, , 1991 Farrington, , 1992 Farrington, , 1995 Homel et al, 1999; Youth Justice Board, 2001 ; the risk of re-offending; the likelihood of a particular offender being responsible for a particular unsolved crime (offender profiling) and finally, the probability of crime victimisation by location and person (Winchester and Jackson, 1982; Coleman, 1986; Groff and LaVigne, 2001 , Armitage, 2006 , 2007 .
The concept of assessing the risk of theft of products (as opposed to the environment) and taking steps to design out that risk, although not entirely new has taken much longer to transfer from research and innovation to practical application, perhaps because of the great primacy of the private sector in designing products. Clarke and Newman (2005) highlight the effectiveness of situational crime reduction in product design, including the use of toughened glasses in British pubs (Design Council, 2002 note progress and problems with a particular product -the mobile phone.
Building upon the work presented by Project MARC (as well as Cohen and Felson, 1979 and Clarke, 1999) the MARC team failed to grasp the importance of the global market in the design, supply and marketing or portable electronic goods, it is vital that the language used in any future risk assessment mechanisms, design standards or guidance is both clear and consistent. A structure for the proposed expert group could (and should) readily be abstracted from the developments outlined in these papers. Finally, Saraga helpfully berates the criminological academy for its latent or overt hostility to manufacturers. One observation of the authors is that despite protracted and intensive efforts to engage the manufacturers of electronic goods in the MARC process, their wish to be involved was minimal or absent. Saraga's point that criminologists have to learn how to present the business case for security is well taken.
As the first paper presented within this journal outlines in more detail, Project MARC aimed to develop a mechanism to assess the risk of theft of electronic products and to take steps to operationalise that mechanism. The project presented both a mechanism for assessment of risk as well as a system to put this in practice. The project authors conclude that the vulnerability checklist designed as part of the project is fit for purpose, however, measuring security through a standardised quantitative checklist risks imposing an artificial ceiling upon the exercise of ingenuity and skill and understates the degree to which security is specific to product type. In short, vulnerability is effectively measurable, security is not. A parallel is the debate about standards, where product security can be designed down to a standard and hence more easily be by-passed. It is suggested that security should be measured by an independent technical group which would deem security features as good, adequate or insufficient with rated vulnerability, yielding a three level rating. In terms of applying the mechanism in practice, the project suggests two systems -the first an accreditation scheme and associated logo (similar to the Secured by Design scheme) which would allow products meeting the required standards to be marketed as a 'Secure Product', the second a 'signposting system' (similar to that suggested by the UK Food Standards Agency) which would provide consumers with instant information relating to levels of vulnerability and security. A third suggestion not raised in the project, is to explore the idea of implementing a system similar to carbontrading where a cap is imposed upon manufacturers in terms of their permitted level of criminogenic design. Manufacturers exceeding their allowances would be required to buy credit from criminocclusive manufacturers. This system is an extension of the polluter-pays principle first raised in crime reduction by Roman and Farrell (2002) . Although this suggestion (as well as others) should be explored further, care must be taken to avoid alienating manufacturers. In the concluding paper, Saraga warns that progress will not be made through name-calling and that the one perspective particularly likely to alienate manufacturers is the application of the polluter pays principle. Whilst Saraga's view that that the direct link between design and crime fails to acknowledge the role of the motivated offender, is not to the conference. A review of the invites suggests that 49% were from the UK and 51% were EU or international. 33% were manufacturers, 29%
criminologists (or from law enforcement backgrounds), 11% represented the insurance sector, 9% consumers, 5% designers, 5% security and 4% policy.
Attendance at the conference was good, the balance between sectors was not. Approximately 80% of those who attended were criminologists or those representing law enforcement. The remaining attendees were policy makers, consumer representatives and those from the insurance sector. Only two attendees represented manufacturers (of the 41 invited). The geographical balance was also disappointing. Although 60% of invitees were from outside the UK, more than 90% of attendees were from UK based organisations. Now to the second concern -that progress within this field has been disjointed and has lacked leadership from a central organisation. In the final paper within this journal, Saraga condemns the Home Office -the Government Department primarily responsible for crime matters within the those from disciplines such as engineering and science to play a part in the reduction and detection of crime. In relation to the second, some progress has been made (McKinnon and Tallam, 2002; Newman and Clarke, 2002; Newman and Clarke, 2003) and it is expected that the work currently being conducted under the AGIS Programme -E-Services Crimes: Theft and Illegal
Use of Electronic Services (led by Professor Farrell at Loughborough
University) will make further progress towards this objective. The third recommendation is crucial to the field of crime proofing products yet is still to be addressed. As Pease (2005) highlights, one of the ways in which this recommendation could be concretized include the application to central government and business the obligation imposed upon local authorities, police, fire services and primary care trusts to consider the crime implications of every decision that they make in Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). Regrettably, despite this recommendation, there remains a failure to extend the provisions of Section 17 to central government and the private sector. In reality this means that whilst legal action ii can be used as an incentive to convince local authority planning departments that (for example)
housing in the area should be built to Secured by Design standards, which render them less vulnerable to victimisation (Armitage, 2000) iii , those who design, manufacture and retail desirable and expensive electronic goods have no legal responsibility for the crime and disorder implications of their products.
Whilst legislation alone may not always be the answer, the omission of central In relation to the fourth recommendation, that a programme be developed to address crime at all stages of a product's life-cycle, the goal is in sight, yet remains frustratingly distant. The sub-elements of this recommendation suggest:
• An annual award for new products which have been designed with crime reduction in mind.
• How to encourage a climate of demand for secure products amongst consumers.
• Identifying the roles for manufacturers, retailers and consumers in developing secure products.
• A voluntary standards system within manufacturing which would show that the criminogenic capacity of a product has been addressed.
Progress has been made with the first in the form of the Student Design
Awards of the Royal Society of Arts well as the Design Council's Design
Challenge competition. The second has remained largely untouched; however, findings from Project MARC strongly recommended that lessons are learnt from the field of designing out crime within the built environment.
Research published in 2003 (Armitage and Everson, 2003) found that hose considering the purchase of a new property rated 'a secure environment' as more important than five other variables selected by estate agents for their popularity. This research also highlighted that consumers are willing to pay for extra security and do not expect developers to absorb these costs. This research has allowed policy makers to challenge developers who suggest that housing described or marketed as 'secure' would give consumers the impression that the areas had a high crime rate. The argument by many developers of electronic products that consumers do not want their products to be safe as a stolen product will be replaced by a new upgraded product must be challenged. Manufacturers need to be confronted with the facts -do Unfortunately by coincidence rather than co-ordination of responses, one of the authors (who sat on the CEN expert group) was asked to comment on the ETSI response to this mandate in January 2007 -17 months after the EU deadline and 16 months after the CEN response was submitted. Unfortunately this lack of co-ordination results in duplication of effort, lack of consistency and ultimately a delay in standards being produced.
It is hoped that this journal will stimulate interest within this subject as well as helping to maintain momentum. It is clear that progress is being achieved and that the gains made in the last two years must not be lost. Many will dismiss the ideas presented within this journal as unfeasible, unrealistic and even insane! What is clear though to the authors is that the craziest course of action would be to allow this hard work to go to waste. Perhaps it is time to be brave and even a little bit mad -in the words of George Bernard Shaw: "We need a few mad people now. See where the sane ones have landed us". The hopes of the authors are that Project MARC and this subsequent publication will encourage the development of an international expert group who can take forward and build upon MARC's recommendations; further funding to explore consumer appetite for secure products, the development of a risk index of electronic products and further exploration of offender decision making at point of theft and finally, that criminologists and manufacturers can become friends.
